Suchergebnisse

The nationalist regime guarded the 1926 December 17 memory, and in the public space they presented only those memories that coincided with the formed discourse justifying the coup. Individual images of the coup, competing with and opposing the discourse, were pushed out of public discourse by means of censorship and condemnation of the author of unfavorable memories, through organizations loyal to and in favor of the regime. 1926 December 17 in the army was remembered with the help of images, in which the unity of the army and the President was actualized, the threat of the Bolsheviks and the transfer of power to A. Smetona were emphasized. The Union of Nationalists linked the legitimacy of the coup not only to the threat of the Bolsheviks, which remained an important highlight of the commemoration, but also to the opposition of the democratic period of the interwar Lithuania and the subsequent epoch after the coup. In the forties coup d'etat was legitimized by representing the government's achievements in foreign policy, education, social and cultural fields. The Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party favored the officers and the fact of the coup, therefore it contributed to the legitimacy of the coup. This attitude remained unchanged after the party found itself in opposition, although at that time moderate criticism of the nationalist regime had already begun.

The article analyzes the reaction of the Lithuanian Armed Forces Command to the Communist putsch in Tallinn in 1924. News to the Lithuanian Armed Forces command about the communist uprising in Tallinn was reached through diplomatic channels, newspapers published in Lithuania and the Political Police. Following the events in Estonia, the Lithuanian Armed Forces Command realized the danger of a communist uprising in Lithuania and developed military plans to suppress a possible communist uprising. According to these plans, units of the Armed Forces and Lithuanian Riflemen's Union had to protect the most important state objects (railway lines, highways, bridges, stations, state institutions, banks, prisons, postal, telephone and telegraph stations), ensure their functioning during the Communist uprising anywhere in Lithuania and we ready to fight Communist uprising. The entire territory of Lithuania, according to the borders of the Military Garissons, was divided into security areas, and arial commanders were appointed, in each area the most important objects of the state were identified and divisions of troops and rifles were assigned to protect them. ; Straipsnyje analizuojama Lietuvos kariuomenės vadovybės reakcija į komunistų sukilimą Taline 1924m. gruodžio 1d. Lietuvos kariuomenės vadovybę žinios apie komunistų sukilimą Estijos sostinėje pasiekė per diplomatinius kanalus, Lietuvoje leidžiamus laikraščius ir politinę policiją jau pirmosiomis dienomis po pučo. Įvykius Estijoje Lietuvos kariuomenės vadovybė suprato kaip komunistų sukilimo pavojaus signalą Lietuvai ir, remdamasi įvykių Taline patirtimi, parengė karinius galimo komunistų sukilimo malšinimo planus. Pagal šiuos planus kariuomenės daliniai ir Lietuvos šaulių sąjungos būriai turėjo apsaugoti svarbiausius valstybės objektus (geležinkelio linijas, plentus, tiltus, stotis, valstybės institucijas, bankus, kalėjimus, pašto, telefono ir telegrafo stotis), užtikrinti jų funkcionavimą galimo komunistų sukilimo metu ir pasirengti malšinti komunistų sukilimą bet kurioje Lietuvos vietoje. Visa Lietuvos teritorija pagal karo apygardų ribas buvo suskirstyta į apsaugos sritis, paskirti tų sričių vadai, kiekvienoje srityje nustatyti svarbiausieji valstybės objektai, paskirti kariuomenės daliniai ir šaulių būriai jiems saugoti.

The nationalist regime guarded the 1926 December 17 memory, and in the public space they presented only those memories that coincided with the formed discourse justifying the coup. Individual images of the coup, competing with and opposing the discourse, were pushed out of public discourse by means of censorship and condemnation of the author of unfavorable memories, through organizations loyal to and in favor of the regime. 1926 December 17 in the army was remembered with the help of images, in which the unity of the army and the President was actualized, the threat of the Bolsheviks and the transfer of power to A. Smetona were emphasized. The Union of Nationalists linked the legitimacy of the coup not only to the threat of the Bolsheviks, which remained an important highlight of the commemoration, but also to the opposition of the democratic period of the interwar Lithuania and the subsequent epoch after the coup. In the forties coup d'etat was legitimized by representing the government's achievements in foreign policy, education, social and cultural fields. The Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party favored the officers and the fact of the coup, therefore it contributed to the legitimacy of the coup. This attitude remained unchanged after the party found itself in opposition, although at that time moderate criticism of the nationalist regime had already begun.

The article analyzes the reaction of the Lithuanian Armed Forces Command to the Communist putsch in Tallinn in 1924. News to the Lithuanian Armed Forces command about the communist uprising in Tallinn was reached through diplomatic channels, newspapers published in Lithuania and the Political Police. Following the events in Estonia, the Lithuanian Armed Forces Command realized the danger of a communist uprising in Lithuania and developed military plans to suppress a possible communist uprising. According to these plans, units of the Armed Forces and Lithuanian Riflemen's Union had to protect the most important state objects (railway lines, highways, bridges, stations, state institutions, banks, prisons, postal, telephone and telegraph stations), ensure their functioning during the Communist uprising anywhere in Lithuania and we ready to fight Communist uprising. The entire territory of Lithuania, according to the borders of the Military Garissons, was divided into security areas, and arial commanders were appointed, in each area the most important objects of the state were identified and divisions of troops and rifles were assigned to protect them.

The article analyzes the reaction of the Lithuanian Armed Forces Command to the Communist putsch in Tallinn in 1924. News to the Lithuanian Armed Forces command about the communist uprising in Tallinn was reached through diplomatic channels, newspapers published in Lithuania and the Political Police. Following the events in Estonia, the Lithuanian Armed Forces Command realized the danger of a communist uprising in Lithuania and developed military plans to suppress a possible communist uprising. According to these plans, units of the Armed Forces and Lithuanian Riflemen's Union had to protect the most important state objects (railway lines, highways, bridges, stations, state institutions, banks, prisons, postal, telephone and telegraph stations), ensure their functioning during the Communist uprising anywhere in Lithuania and we ready to fight Communist uprising. The entire territory of Lithuania, according to the borders of the Military Garissons, was divided into security areas, and arial commanders were appointed, in each area the most important objects of the state were identified and divisions of troops and rifles were assigned to protect them.

The article analyzes the reaction of the Lithuanian Armed Forces Command to the Communist putsch in Tallinn in 1924. News to the Lithuanian Armed Forces command about the communist uprising in Tallinn was reached through diplomatic channels, newspapers published in Lithuania and the Political Police. Following the events in Estonia, the Lithuanian Armed Forces Command realized the danger of a communist uprising in Lithuania and developed military plans to suppress a possible communist uprising. According to these plans, units of the Armed Forces and Lithuanian Riflemen's Union had to protect the most important state objects (railway lines, highways, bridges, stations, state institutions, banks, prisons, postal, telephone and telegraph stations), ensure their functioning during the Communist uprising anywhere in Lithuania and we ready to fight Communist uprising. The entire territory of Lithuania, according to the borders of the Military Garissons, was divided into security areas, and arial commanders were appointed, in each area the most important objects of the state were identified and divisions of troops and rifles were assigned to protect them.

The nationalist regime guarded the 1926 December 17 memory, and in the public space they presented only those memories that coincided with the formed discourse justifying the coup. Individual images of the coup, competing with and opposing the discourse, were pushed out of public discourse by means of censorship and condemnation of the author of unfavorable memories, through organizations loyal to and in favor of the regime. 1926 December 17 in the army was remembered with the help of images, in which the unity of the army and the President was actualized, the threat of the Bolsheviks and the transfer of power to A. Smetona were emphasized. The Union of Nationalists linked the legitimacy of the coup not only to the threat of the Bolsheviks, which remained an important highlight of the commemoration, but also to the opposition of the democratic period of the interwar Lithuania and the subsequent epoch after the coup. In the forties coup d'etat was legitimized by representing the government's achievements in foreign policy, education, social and cultural fields. The Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party favored the officers and the fact of the coup, therefore it contributed to the legitimacy of the coup. This attitude remained unchanged after the party found itself in opposition, although at that time moderate criticism of the nationalist regime had already begun.

The article analyzes the reaction of the Lithuanian Armed Forces Command to the Communist putsch in Tallinn in 1924. News to the Lithuanian Armed Forces command about the communist uprising in Tallinn was reached through diplomatic channels, newspapers published in Lithuania and the Political Police. Following the events in Estonia, the Lithuanian Armed Forces Command realized the danger of a communist uprising in Lithuania and developed military plans to suppress a possible communist uprising. According to these plans, units of the Armed Forces and Lithuanian Riflemen's Union had to protect the most important state objects (railway lines, highways, bridges, stations, state institutions, banks, prisons, postal, telephone and telegraph stations), ensure their functioning during the Communist uprising anywhere in Lithuania and we ready to fight Communist uprising. The entire territory of Lithuania, according to the borders of the Military Garissons, was divided into security areas, and arial commanders were appointed, in each area the most important objects of the state were identified and divisions of troops and rifles were assigned to protect them.

The nationalist regime guarded the 1926 December 17 memory, and in the public space they presented only those memories that coincided with the formed discourse justifying the coup. Individual images of the coup, competing with and opposing the discourse, were pushed out of public discourse by means of censorship and condemnation of the author of unfavorable memories, through organizations loyal to and in favor of the regime. 1926 December 17 in the army was remembered with the help of images, in which the unity of the army and the President was actualized, the threat of the Bolsheviks and the transfer of power to A. Smetona were emphasized. The Union of Nationalists linked the legitimacy of the coup not only to the threat of the Bolsheviks, which remained an important highlight of the commemoration, but also to the opposition of the democratic period of the interwar Lithuania and the subsequent epoch after the coup. In the forties coup d'etat was legitimized by representing the government's achievements in foreign policy, education, social and cultural fields. The Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party favored the officers and the fact of the coup, therefore it contributed to the legitimacy of the coup. This attitude remained unchanged after the party found itself in opposition, although at that time moderate criticism of the nationalist regime had already begun.

The author analyzes the voting rights issue of officers and soldiers regarding the Constitutive Seim of Lithuania. The positions of the main Lithuanian national election commission and the main political parties, consisting of the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Socialist Democrats and the Santara parties are introduced and explained in the article. A lot of attention is focused on finding out an accurate number of officers and soldiers who participated in the election of the Constitutive Seim as candidates of politicals. The author also seeks to emphasize colleration between the opinions of political parties and the number of soldiers in the election list of a particular political party. The biggest part of Lithuanian officers and soldiers who participated as candidates to the Constitutive Seim of Lithuania had done so as members of left-wing political parties, because they shared positive attitudes toward and supported the idea of an active vote right for officers and soldiers. There were also three different atittudes about voting rights in the military forces; some unit commanders where opposed to it due to agitation, officer candidates of left-wing parties supported the idea of an active vote right, and the same opinion was also expressed by the official army magazine. ; Straipsnyje analizuojama karininkų, karo valdininkų ir kareivių dalyvavimo Steigiamojo Seimo rinkimuose problema. Atskleidžiamas Lietuvos kariuomenės vadovybės ir svarbiausių politinių partijų – krikščionių demokratų, socialistų liaudininkų demokratų, valstiečių liaudininkų, socialdemokratų bei "Santaros" – narių požiūris į kariuomenės dalyvavimą Steigiamojo Seimo rinkimuose, išryškinami šių partijų pozicijų skirtumai bei panašumai kariuomenės balsavimo klausimu Seime. Tyrime taip pat atskleidžiamas tikslus karininkų, karo valdininkų ir kareivių, kandidatavusių į Steigiamąjį Seimą ir tapusių jo nariais, skaičius, nagrinėjamas ryšys tarp politinių partijų pozicijų kariuomenės balsavimo rinkimuose į Steigiamąjį Seimą klausimu ir kariškių skaičiaus minėtų partijų kandidatų į Steigiamąjį Seimą sąrašuose. Atskleidžiamas krašto apsaugos ministro, vyriausiojo kariuomenės vado ir karininkijos požiūris į kariuomenės dalyvavimą Steigiamojo Seimo rinkimuose, pristatoma agitacijos kariuomenės gretose problema ir analizuojamas Seimo rinkimų procesas kariuomenėje.

With the creation of the Lithuanian armed forces in the early 20th century, the question ofhaving officers loyal to the idea of the nation-state inevitably arose. It became especially relevantduring the Wars of Independence that followed the First World War. Due to the need tocreate the armed forces urgently, individuals from different backgrounds and with differentexperiences joined the corps of officers in the emerging Lithuanian army. Therefore, a varietyof tensions of a political and social nature arose between them, which in some cases grewinto open conflict. The article examines the question of whether these conflicts were based ondifferences in officers' education, social background, national engagement or experience. Canwe explain the conflicts between the officers by the generation gap? And what role was playedin these conflicts by the experience of military service acquired by some officers in the ImperialRussian army, including experience in the First World War?KEY WORDS: Lithuanian army, Russian army, officer corps, relations between officers and politicians,generational conflicts, prosopography.

The paper presents an analysis of the relationships between Colonel Vincas Grigaliūnas Glovackis, commander of the 2nd Infantry Regiment and one of the major participants in the coup in 1926, and the cabinets led by Mykolas Sleževičius in 1919 and 1926. The author of the research looks into Colonel Grigaliūnas Glovackis' dissatisfaction with the policies of the second and fourth Sleževičius governments, the defiance of government orders by the 2nd Infantry Regiment, and the involvement of Colonel Grigaliūnas Glovackis in the conflict between the Cabinet of Ministers and the State Council in 1919. The paper reveals the colonel's political pro-activeness and his links with politicians representing the Christian Democrats and the Nationalists. The research concludes that the 1926 coup could have been caused not only by the officers' dissatisfaction with the reforms by the coalition government of Popular Peasants and Social Democrats, but also by the conflicts between politically engaged officers and politicians that started as early as the wars of independence.Key words: Lithuanian army, State Council, Cabinet of Ministers, coup, relations between officers and politicians.

Hybrid warfare is perhaps the most frequently used concept in seeking to explain and define Russia's military actions in Ukraine. This article thoroughly analyses the development of the theory of hybrid warfare and circumstances of its formation, draws a line between hybrid warfare and hybrid threats, and discusses the perception of hybrid warfare in the armies of Western states and Russia. Actions of the Russian army in Crimea are analysed on the grounds of the provisions of the theory of hybrid warfare formulated by Frank Hoffman through revealing the impact on a military operation not only of the changing warfare tendencies but also of political, cultural, demographic and military conditions that existed on the Crimean peninsula. The article ends with an assessment of the capability of the hybrid warfare theory, as an analytical category, to explain Russia's military actions in Crimea.

Hybrid warfare is perhaps the most frequently used concept in seeking to explain and define Russia's military actions in Ukraine. This article thoroughly analyses the development of the theory of hybrid warfare and circumstances of its formation, draws a line between hybrid warfare and hybrid threats, and discusses the perception of hybrid warfare in the armies of Western states and Russia. Actions of the Russian army in Crimea are analysed on the grounds of the provisions of the theory of hybrid warfare formulated by Frank Hoffman through revealing the impact on a military operation not only of the changing warfare tendencies but also of political, cultural, demographic and military conditions that existed on the Crimean peninsula. The article ends with an assessment of the capability of the hybrid warfare theory, as an analytical category, to explain Russia's military actions in Crimea.